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Abstract
We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private
duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy
is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private
duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D
and production, however, it does not lead to the equalisation of per
rm output and therefore to an e¢ cient distribution of production
costs. We also nd that privatization of the public rm reduces R&D
activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even
when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.
JEL Classication: L31, L32, O38, L13, L50.
Keywords: mixed duopoly, process innovation, R&D subsidies, pri-
vatization, spillovers.
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1 Introduction
The social benets and costs associated with the existence of public rms
and, as a consequence, the advisability or not of privatization have been the
focus of debate in both the academic and the political world. The academic
literature on mixed oligopoly has shown that, in the absence of subsidies,
privatizing a public rm improves social welfare under a number of di¤erent
assumptions.1 However, it has also been shown that if rmsoutputs are
subsidized privatization does not improve welfare (White, 1996; Pal and
White, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001 and Fjell and Heywood, 2004) .
The above mentioned contributions focused on production related ine¢ -
ciencies and the role of output subsidies in correcting them. In the absence
of subsidies, output levels are suboptimal (as the private rm produces too
little) and the distribution of costs across rms in is ine¢ cient (as the pub-
lic rm tends to produce more but at a higher marginal cost than a private
rm). White (1996), Pal and White (1998) and Poyago-Theotoky (2001)
showed that if the policy maker uses output subsidies to correct those mar-
ket failures, social welfare is una¤ected by privatization (this is the so-called
"irrelevance result"). More recently, Fjell and Heywood (2004) showed that,
in fact, social welfare may even decrease if the (ex-)public rm is a Stackel-
berg leader after privatization. All these results hold in the absence of R&D
investment.
Interestingly, the issues of R&D competition and R&D subsidies in the
context of mixed oligopolies have been explored relatively less extensively.
This clearly contrasts with the key role of R&D subsidies and the role of
public rms in facilitating innovation and the development of national in-
novation systems (Hart, 1998; Katz, 2001). For example, public rms are
key players in sectors such as health care, bio-agriculture and energy sectors
which are all highly R&D intensive (Aanestad et al., 2003, Oehmke, 2001
and Godø et al., 2003).2 Moreover, public subsidies to R&D are routinely
1Namely, that the public rm is less e¢ cient than the private rm and the marginal
cost of production is linear, the market is contestable, the number of private rms is large
enough and there are economies of scale or the public rm is incurring losses (De Fraja
and Delbono 1989, 1990; Estrin and de Meza, 1995; Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1997;
Matsumura and Kanda, 2005).
2There are even some examples of newly established public rms, such as Crown Fibre
Holdings Ltd. a public company in New Zealand that will provide broadband access. See
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/govt+releases+broadband+investment+proposal.
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used by governments to encourage technological innovations. For example,
the EU is running the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) to foster in-
novation in the EU with an overall budget of e50500 million for the period
2007-2014.3 Thus, the study of R&D activity and R&D subsidies in the
context of mixed oligopolies does not only have a purely academic interest
but also clear policy relevance.
Some contributions that have studied R&D activity in mixed markets
(Delbono and Denicolò, 1993 and Poyago-Theotoky, 1998) show that a pub-
lic rm is an e¤ective policy tool in that it achieves e¢ cient outcomes in
terms of R&D investment. In the same context, Ishibashi and Matsumura
(2006) have shown that if innovation size is endogenized, the presence of a
public rm might not be enough to warrant a welfare maximizing outcome.
All these contributions focused on patent races (where a new product or a
new process are introduced) and did not incorporate R&D subsidies into the
frame of analysis.4
In this paper, we emphasize this rather neglected aspect in the mixed
oligopoly literature, by concentrating on the e¤ect of R&D subsidies in the
context of a non-tournament R&D competition model (as opposed to a
patent race) where there are distinct appropriability issues as exemplied by
the presence of spillovers. We thus turn our attention to a mixed oligopoly
investing in e¢ ciency-enhancing R&D, that is, R&D investment leading to a
reduction in the marginal cost of production. This type of R&D has become
particularly relevant in a number of sectors in recent years (for example,
health care and energy).5 It is well-known that the existence of spillovers
discourages this type of R&D by private rms as rms cannot fully appro-
priate the returns to their R&D investments. Therefore, our rst objective
is to study to which extent the provision of subsidies to R&D can alleviate
3Another example comes from research in fuel cells and hydrogen technologies in Nor-
way where public funding to R&D was approximately USe18 million in 2001 (God et al.
2003).
4See also Lin and Ogawa (2005), Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and Nishimori
and Ogawa (2002).
5For example, due to the steady rise in costs in recent years, rms in the health care
sector are trying to innovate to boost their competitiveness. Moreover, policy makers
are also calling for more e¢ ciency in this sector (see, for example CBO Testimony by
Peter Orszag "Growth in Health Care Costs"). The climate change is also posing signif-
icant challenges in terms of energy e¢ ciency to a wide range of industries. A number of
governments are subsidizing energy e¢ ciency innovations, including the EU in its FP7
framework.
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this problem. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst one to
study the e¤ect of R&D subsidies in a mixed oligopoly.
As mentioned before, regardless of the existence of R&D competition,
mixed markets are a¤ected by two production related ine¢ ciencies (subop-
timal output levels and ine¢ cient distribution of production costs). One
can argue that an R&D subsidy could be used to tackle not only the in-
e¢ ciencies related to the R&D activity but also, at least partly, the ones
related to production. The reason for this is that the e¢ ciency-enhancing
R&D activity will a¤ect output by stimulating production (via the reduction
in marginal cost) and by consequence the distribution of production costs
(depending on the equilibrium levels of investment by the competing rms).
Thus, a second objective in our study is to analyze to which extent a subsidy
to R&D will have the same or similar e¤ects to an output subsidy.
Our third objective is to o¤er some tentative policy guidelines regarding
the use of subsidies before and after privatization and to analyze whether
privatization would be welfare-enhancing both in the presence and in the
absence of R&D subsidies. This should shed some light on the di¤erence the
presence of the subsidy makes to the change in welfare and R&D following
privatization. In fact, in the absence of R&D subsidies, it has been shown
that privatizing the public rm tends to reduce R&D activity and welfare
(Tomaru, 2007, and Heywood and Ye, 2009).6 Here we want to examine
whether this result stands if the government subsidizes R&D activity.
We propose a model that uses a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly
undertaking cost-reducing (process) innovation in the presence of spillovers.
We introduce subsidies to R&D in the context of a mixed duopoly. We
assume that both the public rm and the private rm are ex-ante equally
e¢ cient and keep the assumption of increasing marginal cost present in
White (1996), Pal and White (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Fjell and
Heywood (2004) among others others. These two assumptions jointly imply
that any e¢ ciency di¤erential between the private and the public rm is not
exogenously imposed but may endogenously arise from rmsoutput and
R&D choices.
Our results show that the optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the de-
6 In particular, Tomaru (2007) shows that privatising the public rm reduces welfare in
the context of an international duopoly. Heywood and Ye (2009) show that the optimal
extent of (partial) privatization is lower with R&D competition than without it, other
things being equal.
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gree of spillovers and it is lower in the private relative to the mixed market.
R&D subsidies boost R&D, output and welfare in both the private and the
mixed markets. We argue that an R&D subsidy may partly serve the same
purpose as an output subsidy (as it leads to an increase in total output and
may correct to certain extent the ine¢ cient distribution of production costs)
although it does not guarantee the equalization of output and therefore mar-
ginal costs. Our ndings suggest that total R&D investment will decrease
following privatization even when R&D subsidies are provided. The priva-
tization of the public rm tends to increase total prots but always reduces
consumer and social welfare. Interestingly, the private rm may actually
loose out with a privatization in the absence R&D subsidies if the degree of
spillovers is high enough.
We structure the paper as follows: In section 2 we present the model. In
sections 3 and 4 we solve respectively the mixed and private duopoly cases
(with and without subsidies) and study the impact of R&D subsidies on
R&D investments and output. In section 5, we compare the private duopoly
and mixed duopoly with and without subsidies and discuss the implications
for policy-making, with an emphasis on the issue of privatization. Section 6
presents our nal remarks. Proofs to propositions and lemmata are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a simple market setting consisting of two rms competing in
output. We compare two market structures: a mixed duopoly (where one
of the two rms is public) and a private duopoly. A private rm is prot-
maximizing while the public rm is assumed to maximize social welfare.7
In the case of the mixed duopoly, we denote with subscript 0 the public
rm and with subscript 1 the private rm. Demand is linear and given by
P (Q) = a Q, where Q = qi + qj ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g and Q  a.
Firms invest in R&D to lower their marginal cost of production (process
innovation). Then the e¤ective level of R&D, Xi, represents the aggregate
7This assumption is standard in the literature on mixed oligopoly (see e.g., Anderson
et al. (1997), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Heywood (2004), Pal and White
(1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and White (1996, 2002)). A di¤erent assumption, such as
a weighed objective function for the public rm combining prot and welfare maximization,
is useful for addressing the issue of partial-privatization, e.g., Matsumura (1998), but lies
outside the scope of the present paper.
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reduction in rm is marginal cost due to R&D, and has two components:
the own R&D-output level, xi; and the competitors, xj , inuencing rm i
via spillovers
Xi = xi + xj ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g; (1)
where the extent of information leakage or degree of spillovers amongst rms
is captured by the parameter , which is exogenously given (0    1).
To avoid situations where the private rm is driven out of the market,
we assume the existence of diminishing returns to scale by introducing a
quadratic term related to production in the rms cost function.8 Thus,
rm is total cost function depends on its level of production, qi; and the
e¤ective level of R&D, Xi,
Ci(qi; Xi) = (c Xi)qi + q2i , a > c > 0; i 2 f0; 1g: (2)
This modelling of the cost function reects the fact that the public rm
is ex anteequally e¢ cient as the private rm; that is, in the absence of
R&D and for given quantity the cost of production is the same for either
rm. Given Ci(qi; Xi), the marginal cost of production is
mci =
@Ci
@qi
= (c Xi) + 2qi: (3)
This increasing marginal cost leads to a higher unit cost for the public
rm, as ceteris paribus the public rm produces more than the private rm
in equilibrium. The realization of this e¢ ciency di¤erential depends on the
rms R&D and production levels. In other words, we do not assume the
existence of a cost di¤erential between rms but rather, such a di¤erential
arises endogenously in equilibrium (see below). Notice that the e¤ective
level of R&D, Xi; a¤ects only the intercept of the marginal cost (i.e., it
shifts the marginal cost curve downwards) but not its slope.9
R&D is costly with its cost given by   (xi) = x2i ,  > 0: This reects
diminishing returns to R&D investment (or e¤ort/input) xi. For tractability,
we set  = 1 which ensures non-negativity of all variables. By spending x2i
in R&D, a rm can lower its costs by xi due to its own research e¤ort and by
8With a constant marginal cost, the public rm could maximise welfare by pricing at
marginal cost and serving the full market. The assumption of increasing marginal cost
has been widely adopted in the literature on mixed oligopoly.
9This is the same e¤ect that process R&D has on production costs in dAspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and followers, where production costs are linear.
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an additional amount xj via unpaid appropriation of some part of the rival
rms e¤ort. Further, the government subsidizes the R&D level of each rm.
Each rm receives a subsidy s per unit of R&D output, S(xi) = sxi.10 ;11
Thus, the private rm maximizes the following
i = P (Q)qi   Ci(qi; Xi)   (xi) + S(xi), (4)
whereas the public rm maximizes social welfare dened as the sum of con-
sumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) net of R&D subsidies:
SW =
Q2
2|{z}
CS
+ (i + j)| {z }
PS
  s(xi + xj)| {z }
Subsidy
, (5)
which after aggregating yields
SW =
Q2
2
+
X
i
[(a  qi   qj)qi   Ci(qi; Xi)  x2i ]: (6)
Note that the subsidy cancels out when aggregating. This implies that
the subsidy has no direct e¤ect on social welfare, and hence on the objective
function of the public rm. However, the public rms R&D (and output)
will still be a¤ected by the subsidy indirectly, through its impact on the
private rms R&D choice.
To study the e¤ects of R&D subsidization on innovation along with the
e¤ects of privatization on innovation, rm protability and welfare, we con-
sider a multi-stage game with observable actions. The time structure of the
game unfolds as follows: in stage one, the government chooses the level of
the subsidy to R&D to maximize social welfare. In stage two, rms make
simultaneously their R&D decisions and then play a standard Cournot game
in the third stage. We solve the game for a mixed duopoly (where one of
the rms maximizes social welfare while the other maximizes output) and
for a private oligopoly (where both rms are prot maximizers). We denote
with superscript m the mixed duopoly and with p the private duopoly. The
game is solved by backward induction. For comparison purposes, we also
10Our results remain robust in the case that the government subsidizes R&D expendi-
ture. The calculations in that case are available from the authors upon request.
11The government uses a uniform R&D subsidy. The case of di¤erential or targeted
R&D subsidies, although interesting, lies outside the scope of the present paper.
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obtain the equilibrium results for the mixed and the private duopolies in the
absence of R&D subsidies. 12
3 Mixed duopoly
In this section we study the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE
henceforth) for a mixed duopoly. In the last stage, each rm chooses the
quantity that maximizes its objective function, taking the quantity of the
other rm as given. Solving the system of rst-order conditions (FOC hence-
forth) of the relevant maximization problems, yields the following Cournot-
Nash equilibrium quantities13
qm0 (x0; x1) =
3(a  c) + (4  )x0 + (4   1)x1
11
; (7)
qm1 (x0; x1) =
2(a  c) + (3   1)x0 + (3  )x1
11
: (8)
Note that 4    4   1 (and 3    3   1), implying that a rms own
R&D contributes more to its output than to its rivals output (except for
 = 1). After substituting these equilibrium quantities into social welfare
and into the private rms prot function, we proceed to solve the R&D
stage.
3.1 R&D stage
In the second stage, the public rm chooses R&D (cost reduction) to maxi-
mize welfare whereas the private rm decides on its R&D to maximize prot.
Given qm0 and q
m
1 from above; the relevant FOCs give rise to the following
R&D best-response functions
r0(x1) =
(31 + 28)(a  c)  [14  (87  14)]x1
197 + 14(2  3) ; (9)
12 In these cases, the game is reduced to the last two stages and the subsidy rate is
zero. To avoid unnecessary duplications, we will solve the more general cases (mixed
and private duopolies with subsidies) and will obtain the equilibrium results for the cases
without subsidies by setting s = 0 after having obtained the solutions to the second stage.
13We have checked that the second order conditions (and stability conditions where
relevant) for the solutions to all the stages of both the mixed and the private duopoly
games. They are fullled in all cases. Although not reported here, they are available from
the authors upon request.
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r1(x0) =
8(3  )(a  c)  4(3  )(1  3)x0 + 121s
206 + 4(6  ) : (10)
We make a couple of observations regarding the best-response functions
above. First, the best-response function of the public rm does not depend
on the subsidy, s. This implies that the subsidy does not a¤ect directly
the level of R&D investment of the public rm. In fact the subsidy only
a¤ects indirectly the public rm through the level of R&D investment of
its counterpart. This is because the subsidy has no e¤ect on the objective
function of the public rm (it is an inow for the public rm but an outow
for the government, therefore, it cancels out in the social welfare function).
However, the subsidy still a¤ects the equilibrium level of R&D by the public
rm through the e¤ect it exerts on the private rms R&D. Second, the
slope of r0(x1) and r1(x0) is negative for low values of  and positive for
higher values of , implying that R&D is a strategic substitute/complement
depending on the extent of spillovers. The following lemma elaborates.
Lemma 1 In the mixed duopoly, R&D is
i) a strategic substitute for both rms for  < 0:17 ,
ii) a strategic substitute for the private rm but a strategic complement for
the public rm for 0:17 <  < 0:33 and
iii) a strategic complement for both rms for  > 0:33:
Lemma 1 shows that R&D is initially a strategic substitute and becomes
a strategic complement, as spillovers intensify, for both the private and the
public rm. The intuition for this is the following. An increase in the R&D
investment by rm i leads in rst instance to a decrease in the output by
its competitor (which now is comparatively less e¢ cient), thereby reducing
its incentives to conduct R&D.14 However, a second e¤ect arises due to the
existence of spillovers: An increase in the R&D investment by rm i leads to
a decrease in rm js marginal cost through the spillovers, which will have
a positive e¤ect on rm js output and incentives to conduct R&D. If the
degree of spillovers is high enough, the second e¤ect will outweigh the rst
one and as a consequence, the R&D investment on both rms are positively
related (strategic complements). Lemma 1 also states that the threshold
value of the spillovers which turns R&D into a strategic complement (rather
14As R&D investment carries a xed cost, the higher the output by rm i , the higher
the protability of conducting R&D for rm i.
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than substitute) is lower for the public rm; this is due to the fact that the
public rm places a higher value to the spillovers than the private rm, as
it internalizes their social value.
Solving the system of (9) and (10) we obtain the R&D equilibrium out-
comes as a function of the subsidy s
xm0 (s) =
2[25 + 2(18  )](a  c)  s[14  (87  14)]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] (11)
xm1 (s) =
4(9  2)(a  c) + s[197 + 14(2  3)]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] : (12)
The equilibrium quantities can also be rewritten as
qm0 (s) =
2[53 + (31  18)](a  c) + s[ 23 + (102 +    142)]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] ; (13)
qm1 (s) =
11 [2(3 + )(a  c) + s(5  (2  ))]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] : (14)
Setting s = 0 in (11), (12), (14) and (13), we obtain the SPNE solu-
tions for the mixed duopoly without subsidies. Table 1 summarizes
these results.
Table 1: Mixed Duopoly without Subsidies (s = 0)
qm0 js=0 = [53+(31 18)](a c)167+2(25 )(1 ) qm1 js=0 = 11(3+)(a c)167+2(25 )(1 )
xm0 js=0 = [25+2(18 )](a c)167+2(25 )(1 ) xm1 js=0 = 2(9 
2)(a c)
167+2(25 )(1 )
m0 js=0 = (2184+1486 2143
2 9723+3204)(a c)2
(167+2(25 )(1 ))2
m1 js=0 = 2(3+)
2(103+12 22)(a c)2
(167+2(25 )(1 ))2
CSmjs=0 = 2(43+21 9
2)2(a c)2
(167+2(25 )(1 ))2
SWmjs=0 = (7736+6550 2495
3 17283+4784)(a c)2
(167+2(25 )(1 ))2
It is relatively straightforward to observe from the results in Table 1
that, in the absence of subsidies, the public rm invests more on R&D than
the private rm, that is, xm0 js=0 > xm1 js=0.15 The derivatives of xm0 js=0
and xm1 js=0 with respect to  are:
15 It is also interesting to note that the public rms prots are unambiguosly positive
for any .
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@xm0
@

s=0
=
2(a  c)(2381 + 966 + 8112   723 + 24)
[167 + 2(25  )(1  )]2 ; (15)
@xm1
@

s=0
=
2(a  c)( 455 + 602   1042 + 24)
[167 + 2(25  )(1  )]2 : (16)
From (15), it is clear that the public rms R&D investment is increasing
in  even without R&D subsidies, since investing in R&D is more socially de-
sirable the higher the degree of spillovers is.16 In contrast, the private rms
R&D investment is only increasing in  for very high degrees of spillover
( > 0:88) in the absence of subsidies. In other words, as the degree of
spillovers increases, the private rm tends to free-ride more heavily on the
public rms investment, except when the degree of spillovers is almost per-
fect.
From Table 1, it is easy to see that the public rm produces more than the
private rm in the equilibrium without subsidies, that is, qm0 js=0 > qm1 js=0.
However, the public rm also invests more on R&D than the private rm
(xm0 js=0 > xm1 js=0). As a consequence, it is yet unclear whether the marginal
costs of production of the public rm will be lower than that of private rm
in the equilibrium.17 Substituting xm0 js=0 , xm1 js=0, qm0 js=0, qm1 js=0 into (3)
yields
mcm0 js=0 = c+
(81 + 8   342 + 23)(a  c)
167 + 2(25  )(1  ) ; (17)
mcm1 js=0 = c+
(43  3   342 + 23)(a  c)
167 + 2(25  )(1  ) : (18)
Comparing mcm0 js=0 and mcm1 js=0, we now establish that the public rms
marginal cost of production is higher than that of the private rm in equi-
librium, indicating that there are ine¢ ciencies related to the distribution of
the productions costs (it would best if the last units of output produced by
the public rm had been produced by the private rm).
Next, we proceed to examine the e¤ect that a positive R&D subsidy
has in correcting the ine¢ ciencies associated to innovation and output and
16The higher  is, the more e¤ectively knowledge is transferred across rms and there-
fore, the higher the e¢ ciency gains R&D investment
17Recall that the marginal cost of production is increasing in the output level.
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marginal cost levels by means of comparative statics.
3.1.1 R&D subsidization and R&D output (cost reduction)
The following lemma shows the e¤ect of changes in the subsidy rate on rms
R&D output.
Lemma 2
i) The private rms R&D is increasing in the subsidy for all  2 [0 ; 1 ].
ii) The public rms R&D is increasing in the subsidy if   0 :17 and is
decreasing in the subsidy if  < 0 :17 .
iii) Total R&D output, xm0 +x
m
1 , is increasing in the subsidy for all  2 [0 ; 1 ].
Part (i) of Lemma 2 follows from the best-response function of the private
rm, which shifts out as s increases (see equation (10)). It follows that the
private rms R&D investment is always increasing in the subsidy, due to the
fact that the subsidy is a net inow for the private rm. However, the same
does not apply to the public rm, as the subsidy also enters the social welfare
function as a cost, cancelling out the positive e¤ect of the subsidy. Thus, the
subsidy has only an indirect e¤ect on the public rms behavior through the
private rms R&D, as explained above. The relationship between the two
rmsR&D investments (subtitution or complementarity) will determine the
e¤ect of an increase in the subsidy on the public rms R&D. We know from
Lemma 1 that R&D investments are strategic substitutes (complements)
from the point of view of the public rm if  < ()0:17. Thus, if  
(<) 0:17, an increase in s leads to an increase in the private rms R&D
investment in rst instance and, as a consequence of this, to an increase
(decrease) in the public rms investment due to strategic complementarity
(substitution), as stated in part (ii).
Finally, part (iii) shows that the decrease in the public rmsR&D level
(if it takes place) will be outweighed by the increase in the private rms,
resulting in an increase in the total R&D. That is, the public rm will not
reduce its R&D investment (if at all) as s increases to the extent of lowering
aggregate R&D levels.
3.1.2 R&D subsidization and output levels (costs distribution)
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In the next lemma, we analyze the e¤ect of changes in the subsidy rate on
the equilibrium output levels.
Lemma 3 i) The output of the private rm is increasing in the subsidy for
all  2 [0; 1].
ii) The output of the public rm is increasing in the subsidy if   0:23 and
decreasing if ( < 0:23).
iii) Total output, qm0 + q
m
1 , is increasing in the subsidy.
Lemma 3 states that a threshold value for the spillover exists such that
the net impact of the subsidy on the public rms output can be positive
or negative. Two e¤ects are interacting and determining this result: (a)
The R&D subsidy a¤ects the public rms output via the e¤ect it exerts
on its own R&D. In particular, we know from Lemma 2 that the public
rms R&D is decreasing (increasing) in s for  < (>)0:17. (b) The R&D
subsidy impacts the public rmsoutput via the output of the private rm.
An increase in the subsidy leads to an increase in the private rms R&D
and output, which in turn leads to a decrease in the public rms output.
The indirect e¤ect in (b) will only be compensated by the e¤ect in (a) for
 > 0:23. Regarding the private rm, the result is clear-cut: a higher subsidy
will always lead to higher output, as the positive e¤ect of the private R&D
on the private rms output dominates the negative e¤ect through the public
rms output. As well, total output is increasing in s, which highlights the
positive association between R&D and output decisions. Thus, an R&D
subsidy may serve a similar purpose to an output subsidy, as it boosts total
output levels.
White (1996) has shown that an output subsidy results in the redis-
tribution of output from the (ex-post) higher marginal cost public rm to
the lower-marginal cost private rm. Here we want to explore whether an
R&D subsidy could serve a similar purpose. Interestingly, we can infer from
Lemmata 2 and 3 that the e¤ectiveness of an R&D subsidy in redistribut-
ing costs depends crucially on the extent of spillovers. In fact, both R&D
investments and outputs by the two rms converge as s increases for low
values of . Therefore, at least for low values of , the R&D subsidy could
improve the distribution of production costs across rms. In the next sec-
tion, we derive the optimal R&D subsidy and analyze whether it can lead
to the equalization of output and consequently marginal costs across rms.
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In addition, we investigate the role of the subsidy on social welfare.
3.2 Optimal R&D subsidy and its e¤ects
The government chooses the value of the R&D subsidy that maximizes wel-
fare. Substituting equilibrium R&D and quantities into the social welfare
objective function and solving the FOC with respect to s, we nd the equi-
librium R&D subsidy.
sm =
2[3 + (32 + 17   92)](a  c)
162 + [56  (101  72)] (19)
Using this we calculate the equilibrium solutions for the mixed duopoly
with optimal subsidies, summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Mixed Duopoly - Equilibrium Solutions (s = sm)
qm0 js=sm = 3[17+5(2 )](a c)162+[56 (101 72)] qm1 js=sm =
11(3 )(1+)(a c)
162+[56 (101 72)]
xm0 js=sm = [24+7(5+(1 ))](a c)162+[56 (101 72)] xm1 js=sm =
[21+(38+7(1 ))](a c)
162+[56 (101 72)]
m0 js=sm = [2169+(3126+907+110
2 1743 2664+775)](a c)2
[162+(56 (101 72))]2
m1 js=sm = [1863+(2880+966+114
2 1693 2664+775)](a c)2
[162+(56 (101 72))]2
CSmjs=sm = 2[42+13(2 )]
2(a c)2
[162+(56 (101 72))]2
SWmjs=sm = [45+14(2 )](a c)
2
162+[56 (101 72)]
From table 2, it is straightforward to see that when R&D subsidies are
provided the public rm produces more and invests more on R&D than the
private rm. That is, qm0 > q
m
1 and x
m
0 > x
m
1 .
The following Proposition characterizes the optimal R&D subsidy.
Proposition 1 In the mixed duopoly, the optimal R&D subsidy is positive
and increasing in the magnitude of the spillovers.
According to Proposition 1, the R&D subsidy in the mixed duopoly is
positive and increasing in the spillovers. The rationale behind this result
stems from the role that the R&D subsidy plays in correcting a market
failure associated with the imperfect appropriability of R&D due to the
existence of spillovers. Next, we elaborate on this.
Recall that we have stated before that, in the absence of R&D subsidies,
the existence of spillovers generates a free-riding problem, as the private
rm tends to invest less on R&D as  increases, except for very high s.
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An optimal subsidy to R&D alleviates this problem by inducing the private
rm to invest more as  increases. This can be seen from the derivative of
xm1 with respect to :
@xm1
@

s=sm
=
(a  c)(4980 + 2)
[162 + (56  (101  72))]2 ; (20)
where 1 = (6510+828 13722 913 984+495) > 0 8 ,  2 [0; 1].
Moreover, as in the case without subsidies, the public rms R&D investment
is increasing in  when optimal subsidies to R&D are provided:
@xm0
@

s=sm
=
(a  c)(4326 + 1)
[162 + (56  (101  72))]2 ; (21)
where where 2 = (7116 + 525   14562   283   984 + 495) > 0. As
before, the reason is that investing in R&D is more socially desirable the
higher the degree of spillovers. Thus, when an optimal subsidy to R&D
is used, the R&D levels of both the private and the public rm are in-
creasing in the degree of spillovers. This emphasizes the role of the R&D
subsidy in correcting the free-riding problem that exists in the absence of
subsidization.18
We concluded the previous subsection leaving open the question whether
an optimal R&D subsidy would lead to the equalization of rmsoutputs and
therefore costs. We have previously argued (see section 3.2) that a positive
R&D subsidy will tackle the ine¢ ciencies derived from R&D competition
and could potentially address (at least partly) the ine¢ cient distribution
of production costs. qm0 and q
m
1 are reported in Table 2. It is relatively
straightforward to see that qm0 > q
m
1 for any 0 <  < 1. However, we
also know that xm0 > x
m
1 , which implies that the intercept of marginal cost
function is lower for the public rm than for the private rm. Substituting
xm0 , x
m
1 , q
m
0 , q
m
1 into (3), we nd the marginal cost for the two rms in
18 Interestingly, total R&D investment levels are increasing in  not only when optimal
R&D subsidies are provided but also if subsidies are not provided (since @x
m
0
@

s=0
>
Abs
h
@xm1
@

s=0
i
): In other words, the mere presence of the private rm partially corrects
the problem derived from the imperfect appropriability of the R&D results. However, as
shown in Lemma 2, total R&D investment is higher in the presence of subsidies than in
their absence. This highlights the additional benets of employing R&D subsidisies even
in cases where a public rm is being used by the government as a policy tool to tackle the
ine¢ ciencies derived from R&D activity.
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equilibrium:
mcm0 js=sm = c+
(78 + 4   752 + 74)(a  c)
167 + 2(25  )(1  ) (22)
mcm1 js=sm = c+
(45  18   642 + 74)(a  c)
167 + 2(25  )(1  ) : (23)
Comparing the marginal cost in equilibrium of the public and the private
rm under subsidization, we can state the following:
Lemma 4 mcm0 js=sm > mcm1 js=sm for all  2 [0; 1]:
In other words, the public rms marginal cost in equilibrium is higher
than that of the private rm. An optimal R&D subsidy fails to bring about
the equalization of output across rms and therefore it does not lead to
an e¢ cient distribution of the marginal costs. Our results show that R&D
subsidies will not be enough to correct the ine¢ ciencies related to distrib-
ution of production costs when there are spillovers either.19 Thus, the use
of an R&D subsidy only achieves a second best outcome. In fact, given the
existence of both output and R&D related subsidies, achieving the social
optimum (rst best) would require the use of both R&D and output re-
lated instruments. In fact, in a model with R&D competition but without
spillovers, Zikos (2007) has showed that a combination of taxes on R&D
and a subsidy to output, could correct both R&D and production related
ine¢ ciencies. However, it can be argued that the public may not be likely to
accept a policy involving taxation of R&D investment and therefore such a
policy may not be implementable by the government. Hence, the relevance
of studying the second best. Our ndings point towards the trade-o¤ facing
policy makers when using R&D subsidies in mixed markets with spillovers:
R&D subsidies encourage total R&D investment and counteract the private
rmsincentive to free-ride on the public rms investment but will do this at
the expense of perpetuating the ine¢ cient allocation of production costs.20
19Note that the R&D subsidy does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcomes in the last stage
(output).
20The reader may wonder whether the SPNE investments are higher than those that
minimise cost. Interestingly, the magnitude of the subsidy does not a¤ect the cost min-
imising investments and, in fact, both rms cost minimising investments are higher than
the SPNE R&D investments both without and with an (optimal) R&D subsidy. Details
of these calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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Before closing this section, we compare welfare levels in the mixed oligopoly
with and without subsidies. The following result obtains
Lemma 5 SWmjs=sm > SWmjs=0 and @(SW
mjs=sm SWmjs=0)
@ > 0 for all
 2 [0; 1]:
That is, social welfare will be higher in the mixed oligopoly when an (op-
timal) R&D subsidy is used than without a subsidy even without spillovers.
Furthermore, this di¤erence is strictly increasing in the degree of spillovers.
It is worth noting that this result has been derived in a context where sub-
sidies do not involve any deadweight loss. However, it implies that there
is some scope to assume deadweight losses in order to provide subsidies, as
they will boost welfare, particularly as the degree of spillovers intensies.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion presented in this
section:
Proposition 2 In the mixed duopoly, the use of an optimal R&D subsidy
leads to an increase in total R&D investment, output and welfare although
is not su¢ cient to guarantee the e¢ cient distribution of production costs.
4 Private duopoly
In this case both rms are prot-maximizers. In the nal stage of the game,
both rms choose output to maximize prots. Solving the system of the
associated FOCs, we obtain the stage-three equilibrium outputs, which is
common for both regimes (with and without subsidies):
qpi =
3(a  c) + (4  )xi + (4   1)xj
15
; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g: (24)
Substituting these into the prot function of both rms and solving the
system of FOCs, we obtain the following R&D best-response functions
rpi (xj) =
12(4  )(a  c)  4(4  )(1  4)xj + 225s
2[193 + 2(8  )] ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g:
(25)
As in the mixed duopoly, R&D is initially a strategic substitute and be-
comes a strategic complement, as the degree of spillovers increases.21 Solv-
ing the system of the R&D best-response functions, we nd the equilibrium
21Here, the threshold value for the spillover degree is  = 0:25.
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R&D outputs
xpi (s) =
4(4  )(a  c) + 75s
2[67  2(3  )] , i 2 f0; 1g: (26)
Similarly to the e¤ect of the subsidy on private R&D in the mixed
duopoly, note that R&D is also positively related to the subsidy in the pri-
vate duopoly. The equilibrium output as function of the subsidy is written
as
qpi (s) =
15 [2(a  c) + s(1 + )]
2[67  2(3  )] , i 2 f0; 1g: (27)
In this case too, the quantities produced depend positively on the amount
of the subsidy with this e¤ect being the outcome of the positive R&D-output
association. Substituting equilibrium R&D and equilibrium quantities into
the expression for social welfare and performing the maximization with re-
spect to s we obtain
sp =
2(1 + 11)(a  c)
3[22  3(2 + )] : (28)
The result above is the equilibrium optimal R&D subsidy in the private
duopoly. Analogously to sm, one can easily establish that sp is positive and
increasing in .
The R&D and output equilibrium solutions for the public and the private
rms R&D in the absence of subsidies are readily obtained from xpi and q
p
i
by setting s = 0 and s = sp respectively,summarized in the following tables.
Table 3: Private Duopoly Equilibrium Solutions without Subsidies (s = 0)
qpi js=0 = 15(a c)67 6+22 ; i 2 f0; 1g
xpi js=0 = 2(4 )(a c)67 6+22 ; i 2 f0; 1g
pi js=0 = 2(193+16 2
2)(a c)2
(67 6+22)2 ; i 2 f0; 1g
CSpjs=0 = 450(a c)
2
(67 6+22)2
SW pjs=0 = 2(611+32 4
2)(a c)2
(67 6+22)2
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Table 4: Private Duopoly
Equilibrium Solutions with Optimal Subsidies (s = sp)
qpi js=sp = 5(a c)22 3(2+) ; i 2 f0; 1g
xpi js=sp = 3(1+)(a c)22 3(2+) ; i 2 f0; 1g
pi js=sp = [43+(6+13)](a c)
2
[22 3(2+)]2 ; i 2 f0; 1g
CSpjs=sp = 50(a c)
2
[22 3(2+)]2
SW pjs=sp = 6(a c)
2
22 3(2+)
For completeness, we also analyze the role of the subsidies in the private
duopoly in correcting the market failures associated with the existence of
spillovers. It is interesting to note that without subsidies, the derivative of
xpi with respect to  is negative:
@xpi
@

s=0
=  2(43 + 16 + 2
2)(a  c)
[67  2(3  )]2 < 0: (29)
That is, as  increases, rms tend to invest less on R&D. The reason
for this is that rms tend to free-ride more on each others R&D e¤orts as
 increases. Again, this is socially ine¢ cient because R&D becomes more
socially desirable as the degree of spillovers increases. Analogously to the
mixed oligopoly case, a R&D subsidy alleviates this problem.
In contrast, in the case with an optimal subsidy, the derivative of xpi
with respect to  is positive:
@xpi
@

s=sp
=
3(28 + 6 + 32)(a  c)
(67  6 + 22)2 > 0: (30)
Thus, in the private duopoly case, when subsidies are provided, R&D is
increasing in the degree of spillovers. This implies that an R&D subsidy
counteracts the incentives to reduce the level of R&D investment as the
degree of spillovers increases. Furthermore, the total level of R&D will be
higher when subsidies are used than when they are not. This can easily be
seen from the fact that the equilibrium level of R&D (26) is increasing in s.
Finally, comparing welfare levels with and without subsidies (see Tables 3
and 4), we can state that the use of an optimal subsidy boosts social welfare
in the private oligopoly.22 The next proposition summarizes the discussion
22Moreover, as in the case of the mixed oligopoly, the higher the degree of spillovers is,
the higher the di¤erence between the level of social that could be achieved with optimal
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presented in this section:
Proposition 3 In the private duopoly, the use of an optimal R&D subsidy
leads to an increase in total R&D investment, output and welfare.
5 Welfare comparisons
In this section we compare R&D output and quantity produced across the
two market congurations and provide some tentative policy guidelines with
respect to privatizing the public rm. We capture privatization in a very
simple way: the private duopoly is equivalent to a setup where the public
rm maximizes its own prot; in other words, the public rm is privatized.
We pay particular attention to the e¤ect of the presence of the R&D subsidy
to the changes in R&D, output and welfare levels following the privatisation
of the public rm. In order to do this, we compare the two settings (mixed
and private market) in detail both with and without R&D subsidization.
5.1 No R&D subsidies (s = 0)
Without subsidies to R&D in either the mixed or the private duopoly, the
following holds:23
Proposition 4 When R&D subsidies are not provided in either the mixed
or the private duopoly, the following hold:
(i) xm0 js=0 > xp0js=0 for all  2 [0; 1],
(ii) xm1 js=0 < (>) xp1js=0 if  < (>)0:98,
(iii) qm0 js=0 > qp0 js=0 for all  2 [0; 1],
(iv) qm1 js=0 > (6) qp1 js=0 if  > (6)0:76,
(v) m0 js=0 < p0js=0 for all  2 [0; 1], and
(vi) m1 js=0 < (>) p1js=0 if  < (>)0:75:
The intuition behind the remarks about the public rms behavior in the
absence of R&D subsidies (that is, parts (i), (iii) and (v)) seems quite clear:
R&D subsidies and without subsidies.
23Our analysis in this subsection (comparison without subsidies, s = 0) is similar to the
analysis in Heywood and Ye (2009). Our analysis di¤ers from theirs in that we consider
intermediate values of spillovers (which are critical for some of our results) but we do
not contemplate the case of partial privatization. Therefore, our results in this section
complement the results in Heywood and Ye (2009).
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As the public rm does not maximize prots but social welfare, it will tend
to invest and produce more and obtain lower prots than a private rm in
a private duopoly.
Although the results regarding the private rm appear less intuitive,
they can be reconciled when taking into account the existence of spillovers.
Part (iv) states that, in the absence of subsidies, a private rm may produce
more in a mixed market than in a private one for high enough degrees of
spillovers. In principle, a private rm tends to produce more in a private
market than in a mixed one.24 However, a private rm will experience a
higher reduction in its marginal cost through spillovers in a mixed market
than in a private market, since its competitor in a mixed market invests
more on R&D than a private rm would do in a private market, particularly
as the degree of spillovers increases. This second e¤ect (higher e¢ ciency
gains through spillovers in a mixed market) may lead the private rm to
produce more and obtain higher prots in the mixed market for su¢ ciently
high s, as parts (ii) and (vi) state. Interestingly, this e¤ect could even
induce the private rm to invest more in R&D in a mixed market than in a
private one, although this requires practically perfect spillovers as stated in
part (ii).
The next proposition contains the comparison between the mixed and
the private market in terms of total R&D, output and prots.
Proposition 5 In the absence of R&D subsidies:
(i) xm0 js=0 + xm1 js=0 > 2 xpi js=0 and qm0 js=0 + qm1 js=0 > 2 qpi js=0 for all
 2 [0; 1];
(ii) 2 pi js=0 > m0 js=0 + m1 js=0 for all  2 [0; 1].
Although in the absence of subsidies, the private rm may invest less on
R&D and produce less output in a mixed oligopoly than in a private one,
the higher R&D and production activity by the public rm will compensate
for this, leading to higher aggregate R&D and output levels in the mixed
than in the private market. Both rmss prots increase with privatization.
Even when the public rms prots will be reduced after the privatization
( > 0:75), the aggregate prots will still be higher after the privatization.
Finally, regarding social welfare, the following result obtains:
24As a reaction to its competitor which will tend to produce more if it is public than if
it is private.
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Proposition 6 In the absence of subsidies to R&D, SWmjs=0 > SW pjs=0
for all  2 [0; 1]:
The above proposition states that, even without subsidization, social wel-
fare is higher in a mixed oligopoly than in a private duopoly and therefore,
privatization would result in a reduction in total surplus. The presence of
the public rm in the market boosts aggregate R&D investment and output.
This result is in line with the previous literature (Tomaru, 2007 and Hey-
wood and Ye, 2009). Furthermore, our analysis also indicates the existence
of a public rm in the market can even benet its (private) competitor via
spillovers. Thus, a policy involving privatization without using R&D subsi-
dies may even damage the private rms prots, particularly for high degrees
of spillovers.
5.2 Optimal R&D subsidies (sm,sp)
With optimal subsidies to R&D in both the mixed and the private duopoly,
the following holds:
Proposition 7 When socially optimal subsidies to R&D are provided both
in the mixed and the private duopoly, the following hold:
(i) xm0 js=sm > x
p
0js=sp for all  2 [0; 1],
(ii) xm1 js=sm < (>) x
p
1js=sp, if and only if  < (>)0:44,
(iii) qm0 js=sm > q
p
0 js=sp for all  2 [0; 1],
(iv) qm1 js=sm > q
p
1 js=sp for all  2 [0; 1],
(v) m0 js=sm < (>) 
p
0js=sp , if and only if  < (>)0:65 and
(vi) m1 js=sm0 < 
p
1js=sp for all  2 [0; 1].
Parts (i) and (iii) provide the same qualitative results as in the case
without R&D subsidies. That is, the public rm invests more and produces
more than a rm in a private duopoly. Part (ii) states that the private
rm invests more in R&D in a mixed duopoly than in a private duopoly
for intermediate to high degrees of spillovers. As a public rm will invest
more on R&D than a rm in a private market (see part (i)) and the R&D
investments are strategic complements for high degrees of spillovers and
substitutes for lower degrees of spillovers (as lemma (1) shows), it follows
that the private rm will tend to invest more (less) in R&D in a mixed
market than in a private one for high (low) degrees of spillovers.
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Furthermore, a private rm produces more and obtains more prots in a
private duopoly than in the mixed duopoly for any , as parts (iv) and (vi)
state. This di¤ers from the result presented in the case without subsidies,
where we argued that the private rm could benet from the presence of a
public rm via spillovers for su¢ ciently high  and this could compensate
for the ercer competitor in the mixed market. With R&D subsidies, there is
not such a large di¤erence between the e¢ ciency gains from spillovers in the
mixed and in the private market, as the R&D subsidy stimulates investment
by the competing private rm. Thus, the negative e¤ect from the more
intense competition in the mixed market prevails. Part (v) suggests that
a public rm could obtain higher prots than a rm in a private market if
 > 0:65. In addition to facing less strong competition in the mixed than
in the private market,25 the public rm may even obtain higher e¢ ciency
gains via spillovers in a mixed market, as long as the spillover degree is high
enough.26 Thus, for high degrees of spillovers, the two e¤ects go in the same
direction and the public rm obtains higher prots in the mixed market
than if it were privatized.
Proposition 8 When optimal R&D subsidies are provided:
(i) xm0 js=sm + xm1 js=sm > 2 x
p
0js=sp and qm0 js=sm + qm1 js=sm > 2 q
p
1 js=sp for
all  2 [0; 1];
(ii) m0 js=sm + m1 js=sm0 < (>)2 
p
0js=sp if  < (>)0:94.
The above proposition states that, as in the case without R&D subsidies,
the presence of a public rm boosts total R&D investment and output when
optimal R&D subsidies are provided. Total prot tends to be higher in
the private market than in the mixed market when optimal R&D subsidies
are provided. This does not hold for very high degrees of spillovers. When
(optimal) R&D subsidies are provided, the private rm will always be worse-
o¤ in a mixed market than in a private market. However, the public rm
may obtain higher prots in the mixed market than if privatised and even
compensate the lower prots by the private rm for very high degrees of
spillovers.
Bringing together the e¤ect of a privatization on consumer surplus and
on producer surplus, we can state the following:
25Because a private rm produces less in a mixed market than in a private one.
26For  > 0:44, a private rm invests more on R&D in a mixed market than in a private
market if R&D subsidies are provided, as part (ii) states.
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Proposition 9 Under a policy of providing socially optimal subsidies to
R&D, SWmjs=sm > SW pjs=sp for all  2 [0; 1]:
Although the privatization of the public rm would reduce aggregate
output levels and thus lower consumer surplus, it would also lead to higher
producer surplus not only for the private rm but also for the privatized
(ex-public) rm as long as spillovers are not too high. It turns out that the
former negative e¤ect (lower consumer surplus) dominates the latter positive
one (higher producer surplus unless spillovers are almost perfect), inducing
a decline in social welfare following privatization.
Comparing the optimal subsidy to R&D in the mixed and in the private
market, we establish the following:
Proposition 10 sm > sp for all  2 [0; 1].
In other words, the government should provide a larger subsidy in the
mixed market than in the fully private market, ceteris paribus. The intuition
for this results from the fact that output will be higher in a mixed market
than in a private market, therefore rendering investing in R&D more socially
protable in a mixed than in a private market.
5.3 Discussion
The results obtained in the two previous subsections yield several interest-
ing insights into a class of questions relevant to policy making. According
to these results, privatization does reduce consumer surplus both with and
without R&D subsidies, not only because the public rm produces more
than a private rm but also because the presence of the public rm boosts
total R&D spending which in turn favours output. When optimal R&D
subsidies are provided, total prots will generally decrease after privatiza-
tion. Without R&D subsidies, however, total prots are bound to increase
with privatization although the private rm may actually loose out due to
beneting less from R&D spillovers in the private market. All in all, in both
cases, the increase in total prots will not outweigh the decrease in consumer
surplus, rendering lower levels of social welfare. Thus, we can state that pri-
vatising the public rm lowers social welfare and R&D even when (optimal)
R&D subsidies are provided. Hence, our results o¤er some support to the
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view against the widespread adoption of privatization programmes.27 In ad-
dition to these results, we have shown in section 3 that R&D subsidies boost
total R&D investments, total output and social welfare in the mixed (and
also in the private) duopoly. This highlights the additional benets of using
an R&D subsidy to tackle market failures even when a public rm is already
present in the market.
The reader may wonder whether our results regarding the e¤ects of priva-
tization can be reconciled with the existing empirical evidence. Interestingly,
Katz (2001) provides evidence that recently privatized Latin-American rms
scaled down their R&D activities following their privatization . Likewise,
Munari (2002) and Munari et al. (2002) presented similar evidence of re-
structuring and scaling down of R&D activity in several case-studies about
rms from di¤erent countries.28 Using a panel of recently privatized rms,
Munari and Sobrero (2005) showed that rms tend to patent more after be-
ing privatized. This is not necessarily in contrast with our results.29 In fact,
the results of Munari and Sobrero (2005) indicate that the increase in patent
activity is not the result of increases in R&D investment (in fact, they nd
that rms invest less in R&D after being privatized). Rather, it is the result
of the change in rms objectives following privatization (from maximiz-
ing social welfare to maximizing prots), which leads rmsto restructure
their R&D activity and focus on innovations with higher commercial value
(perhaps in detriment of those with higher social value).30
In this paper, we have assumed the existence of two rms. It is therefore
interesting to check whether our result regarding the desirability of privati-
zation extends to an oligopoly. Robustness checks reveal that privatization
increases total surplus only if the number of private rms is su¢ ciently large,
in line with the literature (e.g., De Fraja and Delbono, 1989).31 The rea-
27Following White (1996), we have also compared the case where a subsidy is provided
in the mixed oligopoly with a private oligopoly without subsidies. In such a case, social
welfare also decreases with the privatisation of the public rm.
28 In only one case privatization was not followed by a decrease in R&D activity. This
is the case of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. Interestingly, the authors argue that
in the Japanese case, law restrictions are in place so that R&D activity is not diminished
in consideration of social welfare following a privatization.
29 In fact, our model is not directly comparable in this case, because we focus on R&D
activity when there are spillovers and where innovations cannot be patented.
30Similar observations are made in Ansal and Soyak (1999) in two case studies about
Turkish rms.
31The calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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son for this is that privatizing the public rm improves productive e¢ ciency
(rms in the private oligopoly produce the same amount of output and so
operate at equal costs) but reduces the level of industry output. The gains
in terms of productive e¢ ciency outweigh the losses in terms of allocative
e¢ ciency only when the number of private rms is relatively large. In other
words, in markets with a relatively small number of rms, privatization
would lower social welfare, even if (optimal) R&D subsidies were provided
by the government. In markets with a relatively large number of rms, we
conjecture that a combination of R&D and output policy tools would be
necessary to make the privatization of the public rm irrelevant from the
point of view of social welfare. In other words, we expect that the so-called
"irrelevance" result (that is, the privatization of the public rm not a¤ecting
social welfare) identied in White (1996), Pal and White (1998), Poyago-
Theotoky (2001) and Zikos (2007) could be regained if a combination of
R&D and output subsidies or taxes were implemented.
6 Concluding remarks
Although the literature on R&D has studied extensively the issue of R&D
investment in the presence of spillovers, very little attention has been paid
to the presence of public rms and the role of public policy in this context.
However, there is strong empirical evidence pointing to the importance of
the public sector in highly innovative industries. In this paper we extend
and enrich the relevant literature by introducing a public rm in the context
of a duopoly with spillovers and cost-reducing R&D in order to study the
role of subsidies to R&D and the impact of privatization of the public rm on
R&D and welfare both in the presence and in the absence of R&D subsidies.
Our ndings suggest that the optimal R&D subsidy is positive and in-
creasing in the degree of spillovers. We have shown that an R&D subsidy
leads to an increase in total R&D (as it tackles the problems derived from
the imperfect appropiability of R&D results) and, in a similar fashion to an
output subsidy, it also leads to an increase in total output levels. However,
an R&D subsidy does not lead to the equalization of output and therefore
to an e¢ cient distribution of production costs across rms. We have also
shown that the policy maker should adjust downwards the subsidy rates
following privatization of the public rm, as welfare maximization requires
26
higher subsidization rates in the mixed than in the private duopoly.
According to our results, privatization reduces consumer surplus, irre-
spective of the use of R&D subsidies. This occurs not only because the
public rm tends to produce more than a private rm but also because the
presence of the public rm boosts total R&D spending which stimulates pro-
duction. When optimal R&D subsidies are provided both before and after
privatization, total prots will tend to increase after privatization. Without
R&D subsidies, however, total prots necessarily increase with privatization
although, perhaps surprisingly, the prots of the private rm may actually
be lower after a privatization. The reason for this is that a private rm may
beneting more from knowledge spillovers when competing with a public
rm than when competing with a private rm, since the public rm tends
to invest more on R&D than a private rm. All in all, the increase in total
prots will not outweigh the decrease in consumer surplus, rendering lower
levels of social welfare. This result stands even if the policy maker provides
optimal R&D subsidies. Thus, privatization cannot be recommended in our
context, at least, in cases where number of private rms in the market is
relatively small.
More generally, our analysis has indicated that policy makers face a
trade-o¤ between R&D spending and productive e¢ ciency when designing
optimal policies for market intervention. While the presence of a public
rm may increase total spending in R&D this tends to come at the cost of
introducing another type of distortion related to the composition of R&D
and related cost asymmetry. An R&D subsidy may boost R&D investment
and consequently output but does not eliminate completely the ine¢ cient
distribution of production costs. Hence, a public rm and/or R&D subsidies
may be useful as policy instruments, although with certain limitations.
It should be stressed that these policy implications have been derived
within a rather limited context and care should be taken with generalizing
them. However, even within this limited context, it is clear that the con-
ventional presumption about the desirability and e¢ ciency of privatization
can be overturned when specic features, such as R&D and appropriabil-
ity issues, are considered. Further research is certainly welcome to better
understand the circumstances under which the pursuit of privatization poli-
cies may be desirable from a social viewpoint. In particular, it would be
worthwhile to allow more general demand and cost functions in the frame
27
of analysis.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By di¤erentiating (9) we obtain @r0(x1)=@x1  ()0 if and only
if   ()0:17: Next, di¤erentiating (10) yields @r1(x0)=@x0  ()0 if and
only if   ()0:33: Combining these two observations the result follows.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Di¤erentiating xm0 (s) we obtain
@xm0
@s =
 14+(87 14)
2H ; where H =
167 + 2(25   )(1   ) > 0 8 ,  2 [0; 1]. Given that the denominator
is positive, it follows that @x
m
0
@s  ()0 if and only if   ()0:17. Di¤er-
entiation of xm1 (s) yields
@xm1
@s =
197+14(2 3)
2H > 0 8. Finally,
@(xm0 +x
m
1 )
@s =
183+115 562
2H > 0 8.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For part (i) note that @q
m
0
@s =
 23+(102+ 142)
2H  0 if and only if
  0:23 as H = 167 + 2(25  )(1  ) > 0 8 ,  2 [0; 1]. For part (ii),
@qm1
@s =
11[5 (2 )]
2H > 0 8. Finally,
@(qm0 +q
m
1 )
@s =
16+(40+6 72)
2H > 0 8:
7.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From (19), ds
m
d =
K(a c)
B2
, where (a  c) > 0, K = 2(5016+6114 
1902 10923+2374 2385+636) > 0; B = 162+[56 (101 72)] >
0 8 ,  2 [0; 1]. It follows that dsmd > 0: Next, note that sm j=0=
27(a  c) > 0 and hence by continuity sm > 0 8:
7.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. From (22) and (23), we know that mcm0 js=sm>mcm1 js=sm for any ,
since (78 + 4   752 + 74) > (45  18   642 + 74) 8.
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7.6 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. From tables 3 and 4:
SWmjs=sm   SWmjs=0= (a c)
2(197+28 422)(3+32+172 93)2
(167+2(25 )(1 ))2(167+2(25 )(1 ))
As (167 + 2(25   )(1   )) > 0 and (197 + 28   422) > 0 for any  
[0; 1], we know that SWmjs=sm  SWmjs=0 > 0 for any   [0; 1]. Moreover,
@ SWmjs=0
@ =
21(a c)2
(167+2(25 )(1 ))3 and
@ SWmjs=sm
@ =
2(a c)22
(162+56 1012+74)3 are
both positive since 1 = (160125+224129 316202+460383+110484 
51845 + 9566) > 0 and 2 = (1008 + 2277 + 10222   6303   2944 +
985) > 0: It is tedious but straightforward to check that @ SW
mjs=sm
@ >
@ SWmjs=0
@ for 8. Thus, we know that
@SWm SWmjs=0
@ > 0 8.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From lemma (5), we know that welfare is higher with optimal sub-
sidies than without subsidies in the mixed oligopoly. From lemma (4), we
know that mcm0 js=sm>mcm1 js=sm . From lemmata (2) and (3), we know that
total R&D and output levels are increasing in the subsidy rate and we know
that the optimal subsidy is always positive from proposition (1). The rest
of the proposition follows.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It is straightforward to see from (26) and (27) that both xpi (s) and
qpi (s) are increasing in s: Moreover, s
p = 2(1+11)(a c)3[22 3(2+)] > 0. Thus, we know
that  xpi js=sp >  xpi js=0 and  qpi js=sp >  qpi js=0 : From tables 3 and 4
SW p js=sp   SW p js=0 = 50(1+11)
2(a c)2
(67 6+22)2(22 6 32)2 > 0 8.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. (i) xm0 js=0 xpi js=0 = 3(113+732+72
2 123)(a c)
FC > 0 8; (ii) xm1 js=0 
xpi js=0 = ( 65 87+209
2 543)(a c)
FC < 0 if and only if  < 0 as F =
67   6 + 22 > 0; C = 167 + 50   522 + 23 > 0 and (a   c) >
0; (iii) qm0 js=0   qpi js=0 = (1046+1009 506
2+1403 364)(a c)
FC > 0 8; (iv)
qm1 js=0   qpi js=0 = ( 294 211+780
2 83)(a c)
FC < (>)0 if  < (>)0:76; (v)
m0 js=0  pi js=0 = G(a c)
2
F 2C2
< 0 if and only if  < 0:65, since G =  961178 
2423930   48345312 + 509203 + 5041764   5261605 + 1287646  
125287 + 12968 < 0 8 and (vi) m1 js=0   pi js=0 = L(a c)
2
F 2C2
< (>)0 for
32
 < (>)0:75, since L =  1221274   1155618 + 30609792 + 12181923  
4926624   146405 + 83846   4327 < (>)0 for  < (>)0:75.
7.10 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the mixed duopoly, total R&D, quantities and prots are given
as follows:
xm0 js=0 + xm1 js=0 = [43+(36+4)](a c)C ;
qm0 js=0 + qm1 js=0 = 2[43+21 9
2](a c)
C and
m0 js=0 + m1 js=0= [4038+(2938 1829 972
2+3163)](a c)2
C2
.
In the private duopoly, since rms are symmetric, total R&D, quantities
and prots are given as follows:
2(xpi js=0) = 4(4 )(a c)F ,
2(qpi js=0) = 30(a c)F and
2(pi js=0) = 4[4 ](a c)
2
F 2
:
We then calculate xm0 js=0 + xm1 js=0   2(xpi js=0) = (a c)FC where F =
67 6+22 and C = 167+50 522+23, as in the proof of proposition
4: Since F > 0; C > 0 8 and  = 209 + 2022 + 6342   1443 > 0 8,
it follows that xm0 js=0 + xm1 js=0 > 2(xpi js=0) 8: Next, qm0 js=0 + qm1 js=0  
2(qpi js=0) = $(a c)FC ; the result then follows from the fact that $ = 376 +
399 + 1372 + 663   184 > 0 8; i.e. qm0 + qm1 > 2qpi 8. Next, we
calculate m0 js=0+m1 js=0 2(pi js=0) = {(a c)
2
(FC)2
. This expression is negative
as { =  175678 + 16974 + 1725932   352343   412464 + 111045  
2646 + 167 < 0 8. For  = 0,  =  305496 < 0.
7.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. From the equilibrium solutions for social welfare without subsidies
(see Tables 1 and 2), SWmjs=0   SW pjs=0 = (a c)
2
F 2C2
[    	] where   =
646546 + 990910 + 32084972 + 26777803 + 2084606 +19448 > 0 and
	=7272664 + 7914805 + 203047 > 0. As in the proof of proposition 4,
F = 67  6 + 22 > 0 and C = 167 + 50   522 + 23 > 0 8. It is easy
to see   > 	 8. Thus, SWmjs=0   SW pjs=0 > 0:
7.12 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. (i) xm0 js=sm xpi js=sp = (42 28+7
2+23)(a c)
EB > 0 8; (ii) xm1 js=sm 
xpi js=sp = ( 24+56 2
2 73)(a c)
EB < 0 if and only if  < 0:44 as E = 22  
33
3(2 + ) > 0; B = 162 + [56   (101   72)] > 0 and (a   c) > 0;
(iii) qm0 js=sm   qpi js=sp = 2(156+37 79
2+54)(a c)
EB > 0 8; (iv) qm1 js=sm  
qpi js=sp = 2( 42+3+16
2 4)(a c)
EB < 0 8; (v) m0 js=sm  pi js=sp = F (a c)
2
E2B2
<
0 if and only if  < 0:65, since F =  78696+2712+2277482+198523 
1519224 + 59485 + 303206   17747   22598 + 849 + 5610 < 0 if
and only if  < 0:65 and (vi) m1 js=sm   pi js=sp = L(a c)
2
E2B2
< 0 8, since
L =  226800 35568+3506242+188123 1678324+41545+305156 
15587   22148 + 849 + 5610 < 0 8.
7.13 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. In the mixed duopoly, total R&D, quantities and prots are given
as follows:
xm0 js=sm + xm1 js=sm = [45+(73+14(1 )](a c)B
qm0 js=sm + qm1 js=sm = 2[42+13(2 )](a c)B and
m0 js=sm + m1 js=sm = [4032+(6006+1873+224
2 3433 5324+1545)](a c)2
B2
.
In the private duopoly, since rms are symmetric, R&D, quantities and
prots are given as follows:
2(xpi js=sp) = 6(1+)(a c)E
2(qpi js=sp) = 10(a c)E and
2(pi js=sp) = 2[43+(6+13)](a c)
2
E2
:
We then calculate xm0 js=sm + xm1 js=sm   2(xpi js=sp) = (a c)EB where  =
18+28+52 53 > 0 8 and B and E are dened as in proof of proposition
7 (E = 22   3(2 + ) and . B = 162 + [56   (101   72)]):Recall that
B > 0; E > 0 8. Thus, it follows that xm0 js=sm+ xm1 js=sm > 2(xpi js=sp) 8:
Next, qm0 js=sm+ qm1 js=sm 2(qpi js=sp) = 2(a c)EB ; the result then follows from
the fact that  = 114+40  632+44 > 0 8; i.e. qm0 + qm1 > 2qpi . Next,
we calculate m0 js=sm + m1 js=sm   2(pi js=sp) = (a c)
2
(EB)2
. This expression
is positive whenever  > 0, where  =  305496   32856 + 5783722 +
386643 3197544+101025+608356 33327 44738+1689+11210.
For  = 0,  =  305496 < 0, while for  = 1,  = 22342 > 0. Then by
continuity, there exists a critical value of the spillover parameter , dened
as  = f j  = 0g with  2 (0:028; 1). Straightforward calculation yields
 
 = 0:94. Thus, if  < 0:94, m0 js=sm + m1 js=sm < 2(pi js=sp) and if
  0:94, the reverse holds.
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7.14 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. From (19) and (28) it follows that
sm sp = 2(36+220+42 773+24+45)(a c)3EB where E = 22 3(2+) > 0
and B = 162 + [56   (101   72)] > 0 8. Thus, it is immediate to see
that sm   sp > 0 8.
7.15 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. From the equilibrium solutions for social welfare (see Tables 2 and
4), SWmjs=sm  SW pjs=sp = (18+10 5
2)(a c)2
EB where (18+10 52) > 0,
E = 22  3(2 + ) > 0 and B = 162 + [56  (101  72)] > 0 8. Thus,
it is immediate to see that SWmjs=sm   SW pjs=sp > 0 8.
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